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Abstract
Inferring from inconsistency and making deci-
sions are two problems which have always been
treated separately by researchers in Artificial In-
telligence. Consequently, different models have
been proposed for each category.
Different argumentation systems [2, 7, 10, 11]
have been developed for handling inconsistency
in knowledge bases. Recently, other argumenta-
tion systems [3, 4, 8] have been defined for mak-
ing decisions under uncertainty.
The aim of this paper is to present a general ar-
gumentation framework in which both inferring
from inconsistency and decision making are cap-
tured.
The proposed framework can be used for deci-
sion under uncertainty, multiple criteria decision,
rule-based decision and finally case-based deci-
sion. Moreover, works on classical decision sup-
pose that the information about environment is
coherent, and this no longer required by this gen-
eral framework.
1 INTRODUCTION
Decision making and inference have been studied for a long
time separately. Indeed, they have been considered as two
distinct problems. Consequently, several models have been
proposed for each problem.
The basic idea behind inference is to make conclusions
from a set of premisses. In other terms, to decide whether
a given conclusion is true on the basis of existing informa-
tion.
The decision problem consists of defining a pre-ordering on
a set of possible decisions, on the basis of available infor-
mation and the goals satisfied or violated by each decision.
A common model for both problems is the one based on
argumentation. Argumentation is a reasoning model based
on the construction of arguments in favor and against a
given statement and then to select the most acceptable of
them. Several argumentation systems have been defined for
inferring from inconsistent knowledge bases (e.g. [2, 11]).
Indeed, conclusions supported by acceptable arguments
will be inferred from the knowledge base.
Recently in [3, 4, 8], argumentation has also been used to
model the decision making problem. Such an approach
has indeed some obvious benefits. On the one hand, it
would be more acute with the way humans often deliberate
and finally make a choice. Indeed, humans currently use
arguments for explaining choices which are already made,
or for evaluating potential choices. Each potential choice
has usually pros and cons of various strengths. On the
other hand, a best choice is not only suggested to the
user, but also the reasons of this recommendation can be
provided in a format that is easy to grasp. The idea of
basing decisions on arguments pro and cons was already
advocated more than two hundreds years ago by Benjamin
Franklin [9].
In this paper we argue that inference is part of a decision
problem. The basic idea is to infer from all the available
information, the formulas which are “correctly” supported,
then to classify the different decisions on the basis of these
formulas.
We propose a general argumentation framework in which
the two problems are analyzed and handled. This frame-
work extends the one developed in [1] for inference. The
proposed framework is general enough to capture different
kinds of decision problems such as decision under uncer-
tainty, multiple criteria decision and rule-based decision.
Another feature of the proposed framework is that it ex-
tends classical work on decision theory in the sense that
the hypothesis that the information about environment is
coherent is no longer required by this general framework.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the argumentation process as well as the logical language
which will be used throughout the paper. Section 3 presents
the different kinds of arguments needed to model infer-
ence and decision problems. In section 4 it is shown
how arguments can be compared. Section 5 point out the
different conflicts which may appear between arguments.
In section 6 we define formally an argumentation frame-
work. Section 7 compares our model with existing work
on argumentation-based decision making. Section 8 con-
cludes.
2 ARGUMENTATION PROCESS
Argumentation is a reasoning model which follows the five
following steps:
1. Constructing arguments (in favor of / against a “state-
ment”) from bases.
2. Defining the strengths of those arguments.
3. Determining the different conflicts between the argu-
ments.
4. Evaluating the acceptability of the different argu-
ments.
5. Concluding.
What distinguishes an argumentation framework for
reasoning about beliefs and an argumentation framework
for decision making is mainly the last step of the argumen-
tation process. Indeed, in inference systems, consequence
relations are defined in order to decide which conclusion
should be inferred from a knowledge base. Those con-
clusions are considered “true”. However, things seem
different with decision making. The basic idea behind a
decision problem is to define a pre-ordering, ., on a set
D of possible decisions on the basis of their supporting
arguments.
In what follows, let L be a logical language closed
under negation. Rules are given in terms of L and deter-
mine what inferences are possible. A distinction is made
between strict rules which will enable to define conclusive
inferences and defeasible rules which will enable to define
defeasible inferences only. Note that strict rules based
on monotonic logic (for example first-order logic) are
automatically generated.
• a strict rule is of the form φ1, . . . , φn → φ. S will
gather all the strict rules.
• a defeasible rule is of the form φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ. NS
will gather all the defeasible rules.
where φ1, . . . , φn is a finite, possibly empty, sequence in
L, and φ is a member of L.
Let R = (S,NS) be the set of rules strict and the defea-
sible rules. From L we can distinguish the four following
sets:
1. The set D which gathers all the possible decisions.
2. The set K which represent the knowledge base of an
agent.
3. The set G+ which will gather the positive goals of an
agent. A positive goal represents what an agent wants
to achieve.
4. The set G− which will gather the negative goals of
an agent. A negative goal represents what an agent
rejects.
Definition 1 (Theory) A theory T is a tuple (D, K, G+,
G−).
We suppose that K may be pervaded with uncertainty (the
beliefs are more or less certain), and the goals in G+ and
G− may not have equal priority. Thus, each base is sup-
posed to be equipped with a total preordering ≥.
a ≥ b iff a is at least as certain (resp. as preferred) as b.
For encoding it, we use the set of integers T = {0, 1,. . . , n}
as a linearly ordered scale, where n stands for the highest
level of certainty or importance and ‘0’ corresponds to the
complete lack of certainty or importance. This means that
the base K is partitioned and stratified into K1, . . ., Kn
(K = K1 ∪ . . . ∪ Kn) such that all beliefs in Ki have the
same certainty level and are more certain than beliefs inKj
where j< i. Moreover,K0 is not considered since it gathers
formulas which are completely uncertain, and which are
not at all beliefs of the agent.
Similarly, G+ = G+1 ∪ . . . ∪ G+n and G− = G−1 ∪ . . . ∪ G−n
such that goals in G+i (resp. G−i ) have the same priority and
are more important than goals in G+j (resp. G−j ) where j <
i.
Definition 2 (Closure of a set of formulas) Let F be a set
of formulas in L. We define the closure of F , ClS(F ), un-
der the set of strict rules S as the smallest set satisfying:
• F ⊆ ClS(F ), and
• if φ1, . . . , φn → ψ ∈ S and φ1, . . . , φn ∈ ClS(F )
then ψ ∈ ClS(F ).
Definition 3 (Consistency of a set of formulas) Let F be
a set of formulas in L. F is consistent iff ClS(F ) does not
contain a formula φ and its negation ¬φ. Otherwise, F is
inconsistent.
3 THE ARGUMENTS
Since decisions are made on the basis of available infor-
mation on the environment and the goals of the decision
maker, two categories of arguments will be defined: epis-
temic arguments for supporting beliefs and non-epistemic
arguments for supporting decisions. Among non-epistemic
arguments, one may distinguish between recommending ar-
guments and decision arguments. The idea is that a given
decision may be justified in two ways: i) it is recommended
in a given situation, ii) it satisfies / violates some goals of
the decision maker. Recommending arguments have a de-
ductive form. Indeed, from formulas, one can deduce using
the strict and the defeasible rules a decision. Such argu-
ments are generally constructed for capturing rule-based
decision making. Decision arguments have an abductive
form. These arguments are mainly constructed in case of
decision under uncertainty and in multiple criteria decision.
In what follows, the set of argument structures is defined as
follows:
Definition 4 (Argument structure) Let (D, K, G+, G−)
be different bases.
• if φ ∈ K then φ is an argument structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = {φ}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = φ
SUB(A) = φ
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
strict rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An) → ψ such that
ψ ∈ K then A1, . . . An → ψ is an argument structure
(A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = ψ
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
defeasible rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An) ⇒ ψ such
that ψ ∈ K, then A1, . . . An ⇒ ψ is an argument
structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = ψ
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
strict rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An) → d such that
d ∈ D then A1, . . . An → d is an argument structure
(A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {d}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
defeasible rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An) ⇒ d such
that d ∈ D, then A1, . . . An ⇒ d is an argument
structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {d}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
strict rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An), d→ ψ such that
d ∈ D and ψ ∈ G+ then A1, . . . An, d → ψ is an ar-
gument structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ, d}
GOALS+(A) = {ψ}
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits
a defeasible rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An), d ⇒ ψ
such that d ∈ D and ψ ∈ G+, then A1, . . . An, d⇒ ψ
is an argument structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ, d}
GOALS+(A) = {ψ}
GOALS−(A) = ∅
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits a
strict rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An), d→ ψ such that
d ∈ D and ψ ∈ G− then A1, . . . An, d → ψ is an ar-
gument structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ, d}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = {ψ}
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
• if A1, . . . , An are argument structures s.t. ∀Ai,
GOALS+(Ai) = GOALS−(Ai) = ∅ and there exits
a defeasible rule CONC(A1), . . . , CONC(An), d ⇒ ψ
such that d ∈ D and ψ ∈ G−, then A1, . . . An, d⇒ ψ
is an argument structure (A) with:
PROP(A) = PROP(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ PROP(An) ∪ {ψ, d}
GOALS+(A) = ∅
GOALS−(A) = {ψ}
CONC(A) = d
SUB(A) = SUB(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ SUB(An) ∪ {A}
If GOALS+(A) = ∅ and GOALS−(A) = ∅ and @d ∈
PROP (A) then A is an epistemic argument.
If ∃d ∈ PROP (A) then A is a recommending argument,
and d is a recommended decision.
If GOALS+(A) 6= ∅ or GOALS−(A) 6= ∅ thenA is a decision
argument.
Let Ae be the set of all epistemic arguments, Ar the set of
all recommended arguments, and Ad the set of all decision
arguments. Let A = Ae ∪ Ar ∪ Ad.
Note that all the sub-arguments of a recommending argu-
ment (resp. a decision argument) are epistemic ones. For-
mally:
Property 1 Let A ∈ Ad (resp. Ar). ∀A′ ∈ SUB(A) such
that A 6= A′, then A′ is an epistemic argument.
In order to avoid any wishful thinking, a goal cannot be
used in order to justify a formula.
Unlike beliefs, a given decision may have an argument in
favor of it and also an argument against it which are not
necessarily conflicting. Intuitively, an argument is in fa-
vor of a decision if that decision leads to the satisfaction
of a positive goal. The arguments which recommend de-
cisions are also in favor of that decision. An argument is
against a decision if the decision leads to the satisfaction of
a negative goal. Hence, arguments PRO a decision stress
the positive consequences of the decision, while arguments
CONS are only focusing on the negative ones. Let’s define
two functions which return respectively for a given decision
the arguments which are in favor of it and the arguments
against it.
Definition 5 (Arguments PRO) Let d ∈ D and B ⊆ A.
ArgP (d,B) = {A ∈ B | CONC(A) = d and (GOALS+(A) 6=
∅, or d ∈ PROP(A))}.
Definition 6 (Arguments CONS) Let d ∈ D.
ArgC(d,B) = {A ∈ B | CONC(A) = d and GOALS−(A) 6=
∅}.
Example 1 Let K = {a; d; a ⇒ b; d ⇒ ¬b}. The follow-
ing arguments can be built:
A1 : [a]
A2 : [d]
A3 : [A1 ⇒ b]
A4 : [A2 ⇒ ¬b]
4 COMPARING ARGUMENTS
In [2, 11], it has been argued that arguments may have
forces of various strengths. Different definitions of the
force of an argument have been proposed in [2, 11]. Gen-
erally, the force of an argument can rely on the information
from which it is constructed.
Epistemic arguments involve only one kind of information:
the beliefs. Thus, the arguments using more certain be-
liefs are found stronger than arguments using less certain
beliefs. A certainty level is then associated with each argu-
ment.
Definition 7 (Certainty level) LetA be an argument inA,
and let H = PROP(A) ∩ K. The certainty level of A, de-
noted Cert(A) = min{j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that Hj 6= ∅},
where Hj denotes H ∩ Kj .
Unlike epistemic arguments, arguments in favor of and ar-
guments against decisions involve both goals and beliefs.
Thus, the force of such arguments depends not only on the
quality of beliefs used in these arguments, but also on the
importance of the satisfied (resp. violated) goals. Note that
since recommending arguments involve only beliefs, then
their force is defined in the same way as for epistemic ar-
guments.
Definition 8 (Importance degree) Let A be an argument
in Ad. The importance degree of A, denoted Imp(A) = j
such that φ ∈ GOALS+(A)∩G+j , or φ ∈ GOALS−(A)∩G−j .
The force of an argument is defined then by two values:
Cert which represents the certainty of the beliefs and
Imp which represents the importance of the goals satis-
fied/violated by a given decision.
Definition 9 (Force of an argument) Let A be an argu-
ment. If A is an epistemic or a recommended argument,
then the force of A is Force(A) = Cert(A), otherwise
Force(A) = (Cert(A), Imp(A)).
The forces of arguments will play three roles: i) they allow
an agent to compare different arguments in order to select
the ‘best’ ones, ii) they are useful for determining the ac-
ceptable arguments among the conflicting ones and iii) they
are also used for ordering decisions. In what followswill
denote any preference relation between arguments.
Notation 1 Let A, B be two arguments of A. If  is a pre-
ordering, then A  B means that A is at least as ‘good’ as
B.  and≈ will denote respectively the strict ordering and
the relation of equivalence associated with the preference
between arguments.
Since an argumentation framework for decision making
may have three categories of arguments: epistemic argu-
ments, recommending arguments and decision arguments,
one may show how mixed arguments can be compared, and
how arguments of the same category may be compared.
Epistemic arguments always take precedence over argu-
ments for decisions. The reason is that a decision cannot
be well supported if the beliefs on which it is based are not
justified.
Definition 10 (Epistemic vs arguments for decisions)
Let A be an epistemic argument, and B a decision
argument (resp. a recommended argument). It holds that
A  B.
In normative systems, for instance, where recommending
arguments are built from laws and obligations, it is natural
to prefer a recommending argument to a decision argument.
Definition 11 (Recommending vs decision arguments)
Let A be a recommending argument, and B a decision
argument. It holds that A  B.
However, in some other applications, even if a decision d is
recommended in a given situation, an agent may prefer an-
other decision d′ which satisfies its goals provided that the
beliefs used to justify d′ are more certain than the beliefs
used to recommend d. Formally:
Definition 12 (Recommending vs decision arguments)
Let A be a decision argument and B be a recommending
argument. A  B, iff Cert(A) ≥ Cert(B) and B  A,
iff Cert(B) ≥ Cert(A).
Concerning two epistemic arguments (resp. two recom-
mending arguments), one would prefer the argument with
the highest certainty level.
Definition 13 (Epistemic (resp. recommended) arguments)
Let A,B be two epistemic arguments (resp. two recom-
mending arguments). A is preferred to B, denoted A  B,
iff Force(A) ≥ Force(B).
Now, let’s see how two decision arguments can be com-
pared. Intuitively, a decision is ‘good’ if, according to the
most certain beliefs, it satisfies an important goal. A de-
cision is weaker if it involves beliefs with a low certainty,
or if it only satisfies a goal with low importance. In other
terms, the force of an argument represents to what extent
the decision maker is certain that the decision will satisfy
its most important goals. This suggests the use of a con-
junctive combination of the certainty and the priority of the
most important satisfied (resp. violated) goal.
Definition 14 (Decision arguments) Let A, B be two de-
cision arguments. A  B iff min(Cert(A), Imp(A)) >
min(Cert(B), Imp(B)).
Example 2 Assume the following scale {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Let us consider two decision arguments A and B whose
forces are respectively (3, 2) and (1, 5). In this case the
argument A is preferred to B since min(3, 2) = 2, whereas
min(1, 5) = 1.
However, a simple conjunctive combination is open to dis-
cussion, since it gives an equal weight to the importance of
the goal and to the certainty of the set of beliefs. Indeed,
one may prefer an argument that is certain but has ‘small’
consequences, than an argument which has a rather small
plausibility, but which concerns a very important goal. So
the above criteria may be refined. The aim of this section
is to give an idea of how arguments may be compared, and
not to present an exhaustive list of criteria.
5 DIALECTICAL INTERACTIONS
BETWEEN ARGUMENTS
Since the information may be inconsistent, the arguments
may be conflicting. Indeed, arguments supporting beliefs
may be conflicting. It may also be the case that arguments
supporting beliefs conflict with arguments supporting deci-
sions. Finally, arguments supporting decisions can conflict
with each others. Three different kinds of conflicts may
exist between arguments of the same category and also the
mixed conflicts.
Definition 15 (Rebutting) Let A and B be arguments in
A. A rebut-attacks B iff ∃φ such that φ ∈ PROP(A) and
¬φ ∈ PROP(B). A rebut-defeats B iff A rebut-attacks B
and not (B  A).
Notice that rebut-attacks are symmetric.
Definition 16 (Assumption-attacking) Let A and B be
arguments in A. A assumption-attacks B on A′ iff A has a
subargumentA′ with CONC(A′) = φ andB has an assump-
tion ¬φ. A assumption-defeats B iff A assumption-attacks
B on A′ and it is not the case that the argument ¬φ  A′ .
Note that if an argument A assumption-attacks itself then
{A} is inconsistent.
Definition 17 (Pollock-undercutting) LetA andB be ar-
guments in A. A undercut-attacks and undercut-defeats
B iff B has a subargument B′ of the form B′′1 , . . ., B′′n
⇒ ψ and A has a subargument A′ with CONC(A′) =
¬dCONC(B′′1 ), . . ., CONC(B′′n)⇒ ψe.
The three above relations are brought together in a unique
definition of “defeat”.
Definition 18 (Defeating) Let A and B be arguments. We
say that A defeats B iff:
• A rebut-defeats B,
• A assumption-defeats B, or
• A undercut-defeats B.
Note that since epistemic arguments are always preferred to
decision and recommended arguments, then an epistemic
argument cannot be defeated w.r.t defeat by a decision ar-
gument or a recommended argument.
Property 2 It cannot be the case that ∃ A ∈ Ae and ∃ B
∈ Ad (or B ∈ Ar) such that B defeats A.
6 ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK
Once all the basic concepts introduced, we are now ready
to define an argumentation framework.
Definition 19 (Argumentation framework) Let T be a
theory. An argumentation framework (AF ) built on T is
a triple <A, defeat, > s.t:
• A is the set of arguments (see Definition 4),
• defeat is the relation given in Definition 18.
•  is a preference relation between arguments.
Among all the conflicting arguments, it is important to
know which are the arguments which will be kept for in-
ferring conclusions and for ordering decisions. In [7], dif-
ferent semantics for the notion of acceptability have been
proposed. Let’s recall them here.
Definition 20 (Conflict-free, Defence) Let S ⊆ A.
• A set S is conflict-free iff there exist no Ai, Aj in S
such that Ai defeats Aj .
• A set S defends an argument Ai iff for each argument
B ∈ A, if B defeats Ai there exists C in S such that
C defeats B.
Definition 21 (Acceptability semantics) Let S be a sub-
set of A.
• Admissible: S is an admissible set iff S is conflict-free
and S defends collectively all its elements.
• Preferred: S is a preferred extension iff S is maximal
for set inclusion among the admissible sets of A.
• Complete: an admissible subset S of A is a complete
extension iff every argument which is defended collec-
tively by S belongs to S.
• Stable: a subset S of A is a stable extension iff S is
conflict-free and S defeats each argument which does
not belong to S.
• Grounded: S is the grounded extension iff S is
conflict-free and S is the least fixed point of the char-
acteristic function F of <A, R> (F : 2A → 2A with
F (S) = {A such that A is defended collectively by
S}).
Let S = {E1, . . . , En} be the set of all possible extensions
under a given semantics.
The above extensions may contain epistemic and non-
epistemic arguments. Moreover, each argument which is in
an extension, have all its sub-arguments in that extension.
Proposition 1 Let AF = <A, defeat, > be an argumen-
tation framework and Ei ∈ S. ∀ A ∈ Ei, SUB(A) ∈ Ei.
Once the acceptable arguments defined, the decisions may
be compared on the basis of the quality of their supporting
arguments, and conclusions may be inferred from a knowl-
edge base.
Definition 22 (Inferring) Let AF = <A, defeat, > be
an argumentation framework. ψ is inferred from K, de-
noted by K |∼ ψ, iff ∀ Ei ∈ S, ∃ A ∈ Ei ∩ Ae such that
CONC(A) = ψ.
Output(AF ) = {ψ | K |∼ ψ}.
An important result is that the set of all conclusions inferred
from K is consistent.
Proposition 2 Let AF = <A, defeat, > be an argumen-
tation framework. The set Output(AF ) is consistent.
Elements of Output(AF ) are considered as true. Note that
decisions are not inferred. The reason is that one cannot say
that a given decision is true or false. A decision may have
only acceptable arguments which are against it. In such a
situation that decision should be discarded. So, the idea in
a decision problem, is to construct the arguments in favor
and against each decision. Then among all those argument,
only the strong (acceptable) ones are kept and the different
decisions are compared on the basis of them. Comparing
decisions is an important step in a decision process. Be-
low we present an example of intuitive principle which is
reminiscent of classical principles in decision.
Definition 23 (Comparing decisions) Let AF = <A, de-
feat, > be an argumentation framework and E its
grounded semantics. Let d1, d2 ∈ D. Let ArgP (d1, E)
= (P1, . . ., Pr) and ArgP (d2, E) = (P ′1, . . ., P ′s). Each of
these vectors is assumed to be decreasingly ordered w.r.t 
(e.g. P1  . . .  Pr). Let v = min(r, s).
A pre-ordering . on D is defined as follows: d1 . d2 iff:
• P1  P ′1, or
• ∃ k ≤ v such that Pk  P ′k and ∀ j < k, Pj ≈ P ′j , or
• r > v and ∀ j ≤ v, Pj ≈ P ′j .
The above principle takes into account only the arguments
pro, and prefers a decision which has at least one accept-
able argument pro which is preferred (or stronger) to any
acceptable argument pro the other decision. When the
strongest arguments in favor of d1 and d2 have equivalent
strengths (in the sense of ≈), these arguments are ignored.
We can show that modeling decision making and inference
in the same framework does not affect the result of infer-
ence. Before that, let’s define when two argumentation
frameworks are equivalent.
Definition 24 (Equivalent frameworks) Let (D, K, G+,
G−) be a theory.
An argumentation framework AF = <A, defeat, > is
equivalent to another argumentation framework AF’ =
<A′, defeat’, ′> iff:
• Output(AF ) = Output(AF ′), or
• The pre-ordering . is equivalent to .′, i.e. for any
decisions d, d′ ∈ D, if d . d′ then d .′ d′.
Proposition 3 The two argumentation frameworks <Ae,
defeat, > and <A, defeat, > are equivalent.
The above proposition means that an argumentation frame-
work in which only epistemic arguments are taken into ac-
count will return exactly the same inferences as an argu-
mentation framework is which all the different kinds of ar-
guments are considered.
7 RELATED WORKS
There has been almost no attempt at formalizing the idea of
basing decisions on arguments pro and cons until now if we
except some recent works by Fox and Parsons [8], and by
Bonet and Geffner [4]. However, these works suffer from
some drawbacks: the first one being based on an empirical
calculus while the second one, although more formal, does
not refer to argumentative inference.
More recently, in [3] an argumentation framework for de-
cision making under uncertainty has been proposed. It is
a counterpart, in terms of logical arguments, of the pos-
sibilistic qualitative decision setting (which has been ax-
iomatized both in the von Neumann [5] and in the Savage
styles [6]). That possibilistic setting distinguishes between
pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward risk. This gave
birth to different types of arguments in favor of and against
a possible choice built from a consistent knowledge base
and a consistent goals base in [3]. Indeed, arguments pro
are used to capture the pessimistic attitude whereas argu-
ments cons are used to capture the optimistic one. In our
framework, this corresponds to the particular case whereR
= ∅ which means that there are no conflicts between argu-
ments. Moreover, the sets of epistemic and recommended
arguments are empty (Ar = Ae = ∅). Thus, all the argu-
ments in Ad are acceptable (S = {Ad}). The ordering de-
fined in [3] using a pessimistic attitude is exactly the pre-
ordering . given in definition 23 applied to the argumenta-
tion framework <Ad, ∅, >. However, for capturing the
optimistic attitude, one should use the same argumentation
framework but with the following relation for comparing
decisions:
Definition 25 (Comparing decisions) Let AF = <A, de-
feat, > be an argumentation framework and E its
grounded semantics. Let d1, d2 ∈ D. Let ArgC(d1, E)
= (C1, . . ., Cr) and ArgC(d2, E) = (C ′1, . . ., C ′s). Each of
these vectors is assumed to be decreasingly ordered w.r.t 
(e.g. C1  . . .  Cr). Let v = min(r, s). d1  d2 iff:
• C ′1  C1, or
• ∃ k ≤ v such that C ′k  Ck and ∀ j < k, Cj ≈ C ′j , or
• v < s and ∀ j ≤ v, Cj ≈ C ′j .
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a general formal framework
for decision making and inference. This offers for the first
time a coherent setting for argumentation-based inference
and decision. Unlike inference framework where only epis-
temic arguments exist, in a decision framework two cate-
gories of arguments can be built: epistemic ones and argu-
ments for decisions. This is not surprising since decisions
are based on some available knowledge. The basic idea
behind a decision problem is to infer from the knowledge
base justified conclusions which may support decisions if
any. Then, decisions will be compared on the basis of the
strengths of the arguments in favor and against them. More-
over, the above approach can be applied not only to deci-
sion under uncertainty, but also to multiple criteria decision
problems as well as rule-based decision.
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